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Has McCulloch

failed to establish that the district court

abused

its

discretion

a uniﬁed sentence 0f 10 years, with three years ﬁxed, upon his guilty plea t0 felony

McCulloch Has Failed T0 Establish That The
In October 2017, While

on parole

District

for felony

Court Abused

Its

Ls.6-9; 3/1/19 Tr., p.19, Ls.10-1

1.)

Shortly after they

DUI?

Sentencing Discretion

DUI, McCulloch consumed “‘a

alcohol, drove his brother’s pickup without a valid driver’s license, and

Mocaby, where he and Mocaby “ended up drinking.”

by imposing

the bar,

of

went t0 a bar with Steven

(R., p.14; 3/1 1/19

left

lot’”

TL, p.11, Ls.4-9; p.13,

McCulloch drove

his brother’s

pickup off the roadway and crashed into a “wooden pole and street sign.” (R., p.14.) When
officers responded, the pickup’s engine was still running and its “back end was down in a canal,”
McCulloch was in the driver’s seat, and Mocaby was “unconscious and slumped over in the
passenger seat. The passenger side door was crushed from the crash and the driver side door had
to be pried open by the Fire Department.” (R., p.14.) Officers noted that McCulloch had “a
strong and distinct odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from his person,” and McCulloch
“admitted to consuming two 24 ounce Corona beers at [ ] Mocaby’s house,” but he “denied
driving the vehicle” and refused to engage in field sobriety testing. (R., p.14.) McCulloch and
Mocaby were transported to the hospital, where Mocaby was treated for “injuries and bleeding
from the ears due to a head injury that occurred in the crash.” (R., p.14.) McCulloch refused to
submit to a breath test, stating, “‘I’m not gonna sit here and give a breath test and fail it.’” (R.,
p.14.) Officers requested a blood draw, and results of the blood test showed that McCulloch’s
BAC was .218. (R., p.14.)
Officers later interviewed Mocaby, who reported that, a few days after the crash, he
“received a call from McCulloch telling him to say that Mocaby was driving the pickup during
the time of the crash.” (R., p.14.) McCulloch told Mocaby that “Mocaby would only get a
misdemeanor but it would be a felony charge for McCulloch.”

(R., p.14.)

McCulloch

“threatened to hurt Mocaby if he did not say he was driving.” (R., p.14.)
The state charged McCulloch with felony DUI (second felony DUI within 15 years),
felony intimidating a witness, and driving without privileges. (R., pp.27-31.) Pursuant to a plea
agreement, McCulloch pled guilty to felony DUI and the state dismissed the remaining charges
and agreed to recommend a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.43-44,
63, 66-67.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with three years fixed, and
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ordered that the

sentence run concurrently with “any other sentence.”

McCulloch ﬁled a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.
McCulloch
parties’

factual

asserts his sentence is excessive

because the

(R., pp.73-76.)

district court

did not “follow the

sentencing recommendation” and because, “mindful 0f the district court’s contrary

ﬁnding” and “0f this Court’s deference

the person driving

When

The record supports

When

t0

such ﬁndings,” he “maintains that he was not

roadway and crashed.” (Appellant’s

the truck left the

evaluating Whether a sentence

is

excessive, the court considers the entire length of

State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

621, 628 (2016); State V. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).

ﬁxed portion 0f the sentence

V. Oliver,

limits, the appellant bears the

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

at 8,

must show the sentence

t0 achieve

Will

it

at

628

(citations omitted).

it

T0

is

all

is

m

Within statutory

carry this burden the appellant

0f the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or

Li.

A

sentence

retribution.

Li.

has the discretion t0 weigh those objectives and give them differing weights

I_d.

at 9,

368 P.3d

P.2d 174, 185 (1998). “In deference to the

trial

at

is

628 (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho
the limits prescribed

at

by

The

when

629; State V. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965

its

View 0f a

at 8,

368 P.3d

judge, this Court Will not substitute

reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho

ﬁxed within

presumed

a clear abuse 0f discretion.

excessive under any reasonable View 0f the facts.

deciding upon the sentence.

at

It is

368 P.3d

appears necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective 0f protecting society and

any or

district court

is

burden of demonstrating that

368 P.3d

1, 8,

be the defendant’s probable term of conﬁnement.

144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence

reasonable if

brief, pp.3-5.)

the sentence imposed.

the sentence under an abuse 0f discretion standard.

that the

pp.64-65.)

(R.,

148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).

Furthermore, “[a] sentence

the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of

discretion

the trial court.”

by

Li

(quoting State V. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324

(1982)).

The maximum prison sentence
The

district court

Within the

for felony

DUI

imposed a uniﬁed sentence of 10

statutory

guidelines.

(R.,

10 years. LC. §§ 18-8005(6), -8005(9).

is

years, with three years ﬁxed,

which

Furthermore, McCulloch’s

pp.64-65.)

falls

well

sentence

is

reasonable in light of the perilous nature of the offense and McCulloch’s continuing disregard for
the law, the conditions 0f community supervision, and the safety and well-being of others.

McCulloch has a

convictions for burglary, felony eluding, and prior
(R., pp.10-12, 14, 3

DUI

1 .)

—

his record includes, at the very least,

DUI

convictions in 2008, 2014, and 2016.

history of criminal offending

He was 0n parole

for a felony

DUI When he committed the

instant felony

ways 0n

offense in 2017, and he chose t0 disregard the terms of parole in multiple

the

day

0f the instant offense, as he consumed alcohol, associated with a known felon (he reportedly met

Mocaby

“in jail” and later “threatened to have

Mocaby

violated

by

his

Parole Officer”),

frequented a bar, drove While his driver’s license was suspended and While under the inﬂuence,

and refused
p.1

a

1,

to

submit t0 alcohol

into “a

p.14 (emphasis added); 3/1 1/19
the

Tr., p.10,

Ls.14-15;

community When he drove With

of .218 — well over twice the legal limit — and ran his vehicle off the roadway, crashing

wooden pole and

Who was

street sign.”

both in your

last

p. 14.)

Furthermore, he caused harm t0 his passenger,

and bleeding from the ears due

At sentencing,

to a

the district court aptly stated,

head injury

that

“You were lucky

case but certainly again in this case that although you did injure someone that

didn’t kill him, that

(3/1 1/19

(R., p.14.)

treated at the hospital for “injuries

occurred in the crash.” (R.,

you

(R.,

McCulloch gravely endangered

Ls.7-9; p.13, Ls.6-12.)

BAC

testing.

you didn’t

Tn, p.13, Ls.18-21.)

kill

yourself or

kill

someone

else in our

community.”

On

appeal,

McCulloch “maintains

roadway and crashed,” and — “mindﬁll of the

the

contends that his sentence

on

he was not the person driving when the truck

that

ﬁnding

its

ﬁndings made
State V.

that his

is

district court’s

unreasonable “t0 the extent the

drunk driving caused the crash.”

Thomas, 133 Idaho 682, 688, 991 P.2d 870, 876

clearly erroneous only if they are unsupported

by

m,

(Ct.

144 Idaho 370, 374, 161 P.3d 689, 693

at 874).

The

M

credibility

as trier 0f fact.”

(Ct.

substantial

shown

t0

at

him based
Factual

be clearly erroneous.

m
m

App. 1999). Such ﬁndings are

and competent evidence.

App. 2007)

(citing

at

686, 991 P.2d

0f Witnesses and the weight of testimony are “entrusted to the

trial

court

686, 991 P.2d at 874. McCulloch offered no evidence t0 support his

claim that he was not driving

When

sentenced

(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.)

sentencing must be accepted 0n appeal unless

at

— he

contrary factual finding”

district [court]

left

When

the pickup crashed, and his

show

the crash occurred does not

mere denial

that the district court’s

ﬁnding

that

he was driving

to the contrary

was

erroneous, particularly because the evidence in the record supports the court’s factual ﬁnding.

According
J.

t0 the

Afﬁdavit of Probable Cause and Finding by Court, prepared by Ofﬁcer

Krohn and ﬁled 0n September

McCulloch was

2018,

14,

in the driver’s seat

in a canal,” the “passenger side

pried open

that

by

the Fire Department.”

came from

the

the passenger in the vehicle and

drawn

still

scene of the crash,

was

door was crushed,” and “the driver side door had t0 be

‘a lot’

Monkey

and

Mocaby —

the only reported witness

—

stated

0f alcoholic beverages” 0n the day of the instant

Bizness bar just prior t0 the crash,” and that he “was

McCulloch was

at the hospital after the crash,

at the

running, and the “back end” 0f the pickup

(R., p.14.)

he “observed McCulloch drinking

offense, that “they

ofﬁcers arrived

and Mocaby was “unconscious and slumped over in the

passenger seat,” the pickup’s engine was

“down

When

driving.”

test results

(R., p.14.)

McCulloch’s blood was

from the Idaho State Lab showed

that his

BAC was .218. (R., p.14.) All of this evidence is consistent with, and supports, the district
court’s factual finding that McCulloch was driving while under the influence of alcohol and
crashed the pickup.
Conversely, McCulloch’s claim that he was not driving when the vehicle crashed is not
supported by any evidence. Furthermore, his claim lacks credibility. McCulloch offered no
explanation as to how or why he moved Mocaby – who was unconscious – from the driver’s seat
of the pickup to the passenger seat, or why he (McCulloch) chose to place himself “behind the
wheel … in physical control of the truck,” and leave the engine running, until officers arrived.
(3/1/19 Tr., p.18, Ls.12-15; R., p.14.) McCulloch’s claim that he chose to move into the driver’s
seat of a vehicle that was stuck in a canal, after the vehicle’s other occupant drove the vehicle off
the road and crashed it, is particularly nonsensical considering that McCulloch was on parole for
a felony DUI, his driver’s license was suspended, and he was aware that he would “‘fail’” a
breath test. (R., p.14; 3/11/19 Tr., p.13, Ls.6-9.) McCulloch’s report that he requested or
allowed Mocaby to drive his (McCulloch’s) brother’s pickup is also dubious, given McCulloch
stated he “didn’t know Mr. Mocaby very well,” Mocaby had been consuming alcohol, and
McCulloch apparently had no qualms about getting behind the wheel himself since he
purportedly did just that after the vehicle crashed. (3/11/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.8, 14; 3/1/19 Tr., p.18,
Ls.12-15.) McCulloch’s self-serving statement that he was not driving the pickup, but merely
decided to sit in the driver’s seat with the engine running after someone else crashed it, does not
show that the district court’s finding that he drove while intoxicated and crashed the vehicle was
erroneous, nor does it show that McCulloch’s sentence is unreasonable “to the extent that the
court sentenced him based on its finding” (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5).
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The

district court

considered “all the factors of criminal sentencing” (3/1 1/19 Tr., p.14,

Ls.1-6) and imposed a reasonable sentence in this case.

light

McCulloch’s sentence

is

appropriate in

of the seriousness of the offense, his ongoing criminal behavior, his repeated decisions to

endanger the public by driving while intoxicated, his unwillingness to abide by the terms of

community

supervision, and his failure t0 rehabilitate 0r be deterred.

of the

McCulloch has

facts,

The

to establish

m

an abuse 0f discretion.

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

Given any reasonable View

Court to afﬁrm McCulloch’s conviction and sentence.

18th day of November, 2019.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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I

HEREBY CERTIFY
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I
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day of November, 2019, served a true and
to the attorney listed below by means 0f

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
d0cuments@sapd.state.id.us.

_/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

